
HabitusAnalysis 2 – Praxeology and Meaning

Heinrich Wilhelm Schäfer

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With a preface by Franz Schultheis

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Habitus encompasses the entire inner and outer attitude that people have acquired and consolidated socially. The social practice is organized by the habitus and is in comparison most reliably recognizable through it. If the apparent “hard facts” of the stratification characteristics or capital sorts can only inaccurately indicate the class affiliation of the individuals, it is obvious to start from the analysis of the habitus in research.
(Vester 2007, 26, trans. HWS)

The press has some justified grievances, but on the whole the Government has behaved well and has been surprisingly tolerant of minority opinions. The sinister fact about literary censorship in England is that it is largely voluntary. Unpopular ideas can be silenced, and inconvenient facts kept dark, without the need for any official ban. Anyone who has lived long in a foreign country will know of instances of sensational items of news—things which on their own merits would get the big headlines—being kept right out of the British press, not because the Government intervened but because of a general tacit agreement that “it wouldn’t do” to mention that particular fact. So far as the daily newspapers go, this is easy to understand. The British press is extremely centralised, and most of it is owned by wealthy men who have every motive to be dishonest on certain important topics. But the same kind of veiled censorship also operates in books and periodicals, as well as in plays, films and radio. At any given moment there is an orthodoxy, a body of ideas which it is assumed that all right-thinking people will accept without question. It is not exactly forbidden to say this, that or the other, but it is “not done” to say it, just as in mid-Victorian times it was “not done” to mention trousers in the presence of a lady. Anyone who challenges the prevailing orthodoxy finds himself silenced with surprising effectiveness. A genuinely unfashionable opinion is almost never given a fair hearing, either in the popular press or in the highbrow periodicals.
(Orwell 2002[1945], 889f.)

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Preface

The international reception of Bourdieu's theory of habitus has reached a level that suggests that everything essential has been said. When reading the ever-growing body of secondary literature, one frequently experiences déjà-vu effects, leading to the impression that we are dealing with a passe-partout concept that, with only minimal variations and nuances, appears again and again as old wine in new bottles. Bourdieu himself generally limited this activity. For his journal *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, he imposed the unwritten law that the theoretical concepts he had developed, above all "habitus," should be used only when unavoidable. He commented this with a dry sense of humor: "Stop quoting me: do your own research!"

This is exactly what Heinrich Wilhelm Schäfer and his team demonstrate in an exemplary and refreshing way in the second volume of *HabitusAnalysis*. This is not yet another exegesis of Bourdieu's work, not about the question for the "correct" or "legitimate" interpretation of this concept, not about claims to demonstrate one's own congenial interpretation. Rather, this is about dealing with a comprehensive and complex theoretical work in a way that is relaxed in regard to questions of conceptual orthodoxy. After all, "habitus" is not a concept that can be exactly dated in the history of Bourdieu's work, neither in terms of its introduction nor of its conceptual use. In contrast, it is a research program that has successively developed since the early 1960s during studies about seemingly disparate sociological topics and questions: From the ethos of brotherhood among the Kabyle people, over the societal use of photography and the visitation of museums, to the reproduction of social inequality. "Habitus" has no clear hour of birth, but rather an open end. It is not to be confused with Bourdieu's work, which concluded with his death, it rather refers to the open construction site of socio-theoretical reflection that was initiated by him, inviting us to do further work using this theoretical paradigm and the respective tools of research methodology. The present case of Schäfer's book clearly demonstrates how fruitful it can be to accept this invi-

tation and grant oneself some freedom for the unorthodox use of this theoretical approach.

It may come as a surprise that a sociologist of religion, of all people, is following such an innovative path of theoretical work regarding the concept of habitus. However, considering how much this concept owes to Bourdieu's studies in sociology of religion following Max Weber, one notices some common perspectives and interests. It was during his course on Max Weber at the University of Lille, which Raymond Aron imposed on him, that Bourdieu developed a growing enthusiasm for Weber's reflections about goods of salvation, their monopolization, class-specific salvation demands or the religious virtuosity of elites. In this course, he not only developed his concept of the religious field and capital, but he also discovered Weber's use of the concept of habitus, which remains greatly ignored to this day, most likely due to the fact that it is missing from the index of *Economy and Society*. Bourdieu also treated the work of this great predecessor and progressive thinker with a great deal of autonomy, which was typical of his undisciplined thinking and research as a sociological autodidact. He did not dwell on questions of meticulous exegesis, but continued to work with Weber's stimulating analyses in his own way. At this time, he had already gained extensive experience in empirical research and he had also implemented Weber's theory on the relation between religious dispositions and economic habitus in his own way for his field research in Algeria.

In Schäfer's conceptual work in this theoretical tradition, one also constantly notices that we are not dealing with a typical Homo Academicus who, sitting in his study, imposes his theoretical sense on the practical sense of societal actors in a top-down manner. In contrast, he can rely on a rich empirical perspective and its theoretical processing that feeds his large-scale study on habitus and the social conditions of its operation.

As a reminder: *HabitusAnalysis 1* was about the detailed analysis of Bourdieu's sociological handling of the meaning of practices, goods, signs, language, and so on, on the basis of almost all scientific publications by Bourdieu. In this context, Bourdieu's contributions that were oriented explicitly toward social theory, as well as the empirical studies since the earliest autodidactic sociological attempts to walk in Kabylia, were subjected to a critical-reflexive reconstruction. This twofold approach is convincing simply because all of Bourdieu's theoretical concepts were developed during diverse field studies and elaborate empirical studies in the sense of a grounded theory *avant la lettre*.

In this second volume of *HabitusAnalysis*, Bourdieu's diverse theoretical considerations are subject of a careful re-lecture in order to arrive at a disposition-based theory of habitus, which serves Schäfer as the theoretical and meth-

odological basis for a theory of identity as a network of disposition. In doing so, the author aims at reconstructing and making comprehensible the complex interdependencies between mental and ethical orientations, societal structures and processes, as well as between social divisions and subdivisions—classes and classifications. Dispositions are always interpreted as dependent on the position, as located in the social space.

The present book aims explicitly at the construction of a theoretical framework for the sociological analysis of religious praxis, yet it does not focus its theoretical argumentation on religion alone. Rather, it is about understanding religious praxis in a manner quite similar to how Bourdieu did, namely as just one of many diverse forms of human praxis, allowing for its own peculiarities, but also analyzing it in terms of its functional and structural similarities to other forms of societal praxis. In this way, the sociological analysis of religion based on diverse empirical experiences that is presented here takes on the character of an exemplary contribution to general sociology. By systematically linking complex theoretical considerations with illustrative empirical descriptions, the theoretical work on the habitus concept, on the practical logic of action, and its socio-structural conditions based on Bourdieu and going beyond, gains a new level of consistency in terms of operationalization and concretization and makes a refreshingly innovative contribution to “research with Bourdieu.”

Franz Schultheis

Preliminary remarks

I met Francisco Quiacaín again on a cool morning by the shores of the lake. The smell of the early fires from the villager's kitchens mingling with the fog, the first rays of sunshine coming through. Seven years had passed since our fieldwork in 1985 and 1986. Now, the war was over. Two mildly democratic elections had been held. For the villagers, things had changed a lot since there was no longer a military garrison nearby and they were able to rebuild their rural economy with some perspective of future improvement. Francisco had been one of our closest cooperators—"informants" as older anthropology would have—in the village during the war. At that time, he had been clearly aware of the constant threat that the military represented for the village. One of his own relatives had been kidnapped from his shack by soldiers at dawn and massacred in the outskirts of the village. However, Francisco also had been aware of God's promise. He, and the whole congregation of the Assemblies of God he was part of, firmly believed that the war was a clear sign of the end-times and that they, the faithful and true believers, were going to be raptured into heaven when Christ came back on the clouds of heaven, which they believed would happen very soon. Francisco was extremely convinced that event was drawing very near and he encouraged his fellow believers to prepare for the coming of the Lord. Preparation meant strictly abstaining from engaging in any "worldly" activity, such as cooperatives, social service, farmhand unions, and even more so the ranks of the guerrilla. Instead, getting ready to welcome the Lord meant withdrawing from the "world" and emerging oneself in the congregation, visiting the services frequently, praying, and always being ready to help any other believer in times of need. It was not possible to prevent the world outside from getting worse each day. Yet, while waiting for Christ to come, the scarce resources had to be shared among the sisters and brothers in faith. Nevertheless, instead of the return of Christ, elections took place and a peace accord was signed. Sometime later, after the outside pressure on the believers had lessened, a conflict over authority with the *mestizo* pastor of the congregation broke out and

part of the congregation left and joined what they called an “indigenous Pentecostal” church made up of only autochthon villagers. Francisco became deacon and was able to boost his (very) small business to a certain extent. When I met him, he was quite well-off and had built a little house in a small settlement on the outskirts of the village. Still serving as deacon, he was also active in the neighborhood committee’s mobilization to demand a clean water supply and electricity—and in the elections, he had voted for the left-most alternative. Given his fierce preaching of the immediate return of Christ, his rise to a high religious position was nothing to be amazed by. His commitment in the neighborhood committee, together with unbelievers, however, took me by surprise. Of course, I reminded him of the key premise of his Christian faith: the deep conviction that the coming of Christ was immediate, and that the consequence was to withdraw from any social activity whatsoever. He was still as theologically serious as ever, and argued in great detail: There is no doubt that the Lord is going to come back; but one does not know if this is going to take place next week, next year, or in, let’s say, twenty years. Therefore, a Christian must be disciplined and obedient to the precepts of the Lord, refrain from sinful behavior such as drinking, smoking, and womanizing, and promote a decent life for everybody, Christian or not. In any case, this is not a matter of choice, since the Lord *will* come back, and humans will be held responsible for their actions.

The delay of the Second Coming, among other things, made this book possible, as it was a task that certainly took its time. In the preface of volume 1, we told the entire story of our initial field research in Guatemala during the 1980s; of the proceeding years in Latin America; the dissertations based on *HabitusAnalysis* that have been and are being written at Bielefeld University since 2006; and my own writing business. We also referred to the scientific context of friendly and helpful colleagues. It need not to be repeated here. In the meantime, among the team at our Center for the Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Society (CIRRuS), some new dissertations, books, and papers have been published and some others are under way.¹ In the context of the intense exchange within our team, this all contributed to the present book.

1 Dissertations: Cecilia Delgado on religion, politics, and violence in Morelos, Mexico; Jacobo Tancara on the construction of subjectivity in urban marginal literature and Theology of Liberation; Rory Tews in economics on social entrepreneurs. Ongoing projects: on religious peacebuilders in Guatemala (Tamara Candela); Central American migrants in Los Angeles (Clara Buitrago); religious individuation in the megacity of Ciudad de México (Adrián Tovar); urban space and religious strategies in Mana-

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the following institutions and people for their support. The German Research Foundation stayed true to the project and facilitated a one-year research leave in 2016. The Stockmeier Foundation facilitated additional funding. The presidency of Bielefeld University supported the project in many ways. The Stockmeier foundation helped to fill the financial gaps that occur every now and then. Furthermore, the Springer publishing house stayed true to our project. Megan Hanson did a great job on English copy editing. She made the text readable. At the end of this preface, I would like to express very special thanks to Sebastian Schlerka, who performed wonderfully as a critical reader, the author of most of the summaries, and a very reliable manager of the technical work on this book. Another very special thank you goes to Leif Seibert who has not only been deeply involved with this project over the course of many years; he has also nurtured it in many ways with his profound and ample knowledge, from philosophy and logics, via religious studies, through to sociological theory and methodology. Taking into account the scientific context mentioned on the last pages, the good parts of this book are largely due to these people and institutions; the author holds himself responsible for any flaws.

One thing remains the same as it has been in the work on volume 1, and will remain unchanged with regard to volume 3. The work on this project resembles the strong and slow boring of hard boards...with passion and perspective, as Max Weber once said about politics.

gua, Nicaragua (Alvaro Espinoza); perception of muslim migrants by the German parliament (Sebastian Schlerka). Publications: Schäfer 2015a; 2016a; Schäfer et al. 2015a; 2015b; 2018; Schäfer, Reu, and Tovar 2017; Schäfer, Seibert, and Tovar 2019; Seibert 2018; Schlerka 2017; 2018.

Conference papers are not listed here.

Introduction

Over the course of the ten years between our first cooperation during the war and our second meeting in the mid-1990s, Francisco Quiacáin's dispositions of how he saw the world had changed. To be more precise: his habitus showed continuities, but also new elements. Furthermore, the central focus of his convictions had definitely shifted. Habitus change according to the challenges a person or a group faces; but they also remain the same in many regards. These processes are best understood by the habitus modeled as a network of dispositions. From this perspective, the relations between dispositions and social interactions, events, and structural conditions appear to the sociological eye as myriads of relations, which combine in varying ways to become notable social effects. Embodied conditions, such as dispositions of perception, judgment, and action orientation as well as objectified conditions, such as common sense, law, material structures, conditions of production and distribution of goods, can be understood sociologically as caught up in a constant dynamic of interrelation. Hence, things vary, yet they do not vary in a completely senseless or chaotic way. Maybe one can understand continuities and changes in society and human action a bit like theme and improvisation in jazz. These interrelations between embodied dispositions and objectified conditions have to be described in a sociological theory before we can develop models that are particularly apt to capture such social interplay.

After having discussed the epistemological conditions of our proposal in volume 1, we will approach the task of designing a sociological framework in the present book. We will continue to follow Bourdieu, but we will not replicate his theory one-to-one. In any case, an attempt to do so would assume that there is an orthodox interpretation of Bourdieu's work and engage in struggles over the hegemony in the field of Bourdieu specialists. We do not claim orthodoxy. Therefore, we will pay tribute to scholars specialized in Bourdieu's work, but we

generally will not engage in polemics about the “one true” interpretation.² We will focus on our interpretation of Bourdieu’s work and the new elements we add to it. Our goal is a theory and a method that help in understanding the varying linkages between convictions of people and the conditions of their social environment. Therefore, we will not excoriate Bourdieu’s sociology; that is, we will not pull the cheap ploy of “Mister X now shows the ‘sociologist of the century’ to be all wrong.” Nor will we follow every one of Bourdieu’s proposals; that is, we will maintain, for instance, a critical stance towards the “field of power.” We will also make a couple of proposals, which we have gratefully established upon the foundation of Bourdieu’s work, but which go a step further. Finally, we do not show off the prophetic habitus of scholars who identify foes left and right in order to create from the alchemy of the *argumentum ad temperantiam* a miraculously true middle position for themselves. However, this does not mean that we do not engage in controversies when necessary. One of these few issues that we argue about is the allegation by some scholars that Bourdieu was a “determinist”—whatever they mean by that.

Notwithstanding, sociology does not take place in a void. Rather, the *field of sociology* is a highly conflictive area. Therefore, any publication inevitably and objectively conveys its positioning in distinction from or even in contradiction to other positions. It is quite probable that readers will see tension between our approach and some sociological currents that are en vogue today: especially individualist and teleological theories of (rational) action, subjectivist theories of intersubjective world-making, and, finally, post-modernist neo-idealism in its different forms—particularly those theories that neglect or disregard material production and social structures when dealing with discourse and practices. We are rather somewhat conservative and recall that sociology is about “concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences” (Weber 1978, 4). From a praxeological point of view, this also means reconstructing the meaning that the actors under inquiry themselves ascribe to their experiences; but it also necessarily means reconstructing the economic, political and military facts (among others) that condition these experiences. In other words, and in spite of our particular in-

2 For instance, we do not take sides in the so-called *homines in extremis*-debate or similar issues (Wacquant 2014a; 2014b; Atkinson 2015; G 2015; Lahire 2003; 2011). At most, we discuss them briefly with a side note and rather develop our own position that will be granted its place in relation to this debate if someone becomes interested in this relation. Secondary literature and alternative approaches will of course be discussed throughout the entire book.

terest in meaning, we are not afforded the divine right to float in the thin air of semiology and “textism”³—a condition that however by no means implies falling prey to “materialism.”

This takes us to the issue of *religion*. The method of the praxeological square and the entire program of HabitusAnalysis have been developed primarily during the sociological study of religious praxis. Religious praxis is also a main reference point in the present book. Nevertheless, the program of HabitusAnalysis and its methods are broadly sociological and extend far beyond the sociology of religion.⁴ Therefore, neither in volume 1 nor in this book we focus specifically on religion. We will devote a great deal of attention to meaning, its production, and its effects in society. Given the present state of the art in sociology of religion, the combination of meaning and religion seems to tempt sociologists to take the easy path of neo-idealism and stick only to language or symbolic exchange. Hence, in the following lines we will locate our approach roughly within the frame of some present developments and debates.

We will refer to the results of two studies. A recent review is interested in *Bringing back the social into the sociology of religion* and critically examines current debates. Furthermore, an empirical survey of publications by US-American sociologists of religion over the last 40 years focuses especially on the construction of causality and on religious bias.⁵ Both studies highlight two observations. The first is a return of *religious* sociology of religion. An increasing number of academics apparently insist that scholars of religion have to be engaged in religious praxis themselves and criticize a former “secularist” disdain among sociologists of religion. We understand the concern that “enlightened” sociologists could possibly be unwilling to see anything other than priestly fraud—as Bourdieu tends to do—as well as the concern that sociologists of religion are ill-informed about religious praxis. We also share the admiration for the detailed knowledge shown by phenomenologists. However, none of this provides sufficient reason to regress to Rudolf Otto (1959). Particularly *because* I am not only a sociologist, but also theologian, I strongly opt for Max Weber’s position. His interest in religion is not focused on the “essence of religion” (Weber 1978, 399), but on religious social

3 We talk about a “semiological vision of the world (...) which constitutes social reality as text” (Bourdieu 2004b; see also 1990e, G: 1998k).

4 See in the Preface, note 1. For our concept of religion, see, for instance, the following publications: Schäfer 2016a; 2016b; 2014a; Schäfer et al. 2015a.

5 Altglas and Wood 2018b. See especially the following contributions to this volume: Altglas and Wood 2018a; Malogne-Fer 2018; Doak 2018; Monnot 2018; Fer 2018. The results of the empirical study are published in Smilde and May 2010; 2015.

praxis; and generally social science should avoid value judgment (Weber 1949, 50ff.). Hence, an attitude of methodological agnosticism is a standard that was established many years ago. It prevents both a bias in favor and a bias to the detriment of religion. From this point of view, postulating that social science must account for transcendent beings⁶ implies the confusion of sociology with theology. They transpose the *illud* of the religious field to the field of social science (Altglas and Wood 2018a, 13). More precisely, the attempt at a religious sociology rather jeopardizes responsible sociological epistemology. The latter respects the limits of scientific knowledge and therefore concentrates on the *faith* of the observed actors⁷ rather than on metaphysical beliefs of the researcher. Believers' faith in a transcendent being can be understood well enough if the sociologist accepts and systematically takes into account that believers can act as if their faith was able to move mountains (Mt. 21: 21) (Schäfer 2014a, 2). This said, religious language and dispositions should be understood as having a specific structure. The actors' relation to transcendence plays a specific role that has to be accounted for by research methodology (see vol. 3). Nevertheless, sociology of religion will have to address not only the faith, but also the mountains that are to be moved.

This brings us to the other problem stated with regard to the sociological production of religion. It is the fact that religion is merely seen as ideas and communication, or finally, as text. Smilde and May take the sociology of the so-called "strong program" (Jeffrey Alexander) as their prototype for this kind of approach. One also could refer to certain currents of European sociology based on phenomenology, focused on discourse, and ignoring social structures, especially socio-economic production and reproduction. In other words, we face a kind of textism. Interestingly, Smilde and May prove a correlation between this sociological textism and a positive bias towards religion. This may be due to the fact that the exclusive focus on religious discourse simply fails to approach the social conditions and the social effects of religious praxis.⁸ (At least, there is no systematic way to tackle these conditions.) In a way, this is similar to a person that deliberately blinds one of their eyes in order to live without depth perception. Smilde and May

6 See, for instance, Archer 2004; Doak 2018.

7 Even hermeneutic theology respects that we cannot claim to see God as we "see a cow" (Meister Eckart) but that the object of theological knowledge is faith. Among others, see Ebeling 1979; Schäfer 2004a.

8 A similar opposition haunts the sociology of religion in Germany with its sharp separation (not distinction) between "qualitative" and "quantitative" approaches and a grim debate about the possibility of a mutual benefit. Kelle (2008, 13ff., 25ff.) attempts to overcome the blockade.

put the problem in yet another perspective. They were indeed able to categorize the literature produced in the USA according to a criterion fostered by Alexander's approach: whether culture/religion or social structure are the independent or the dependent variable. The fact that this distinction proves to be significant in a study on scholarly publications says a lot about the either-or mentality that seems to pervade the social science production on religion. From a praxeological point of view, however, the epistemological question is misguided altogether. It is not about an either-or relation between beliefs and material structures (see volume 1), but about praxis that always unfolds under the influence of both mental and material conditions.

The praxeological approach to religion as well as to wider social praxis stands for the latter point of view.⁹ If one put it in terms of causality, one could state that causal effects are exerted from both sides, so to say, but with continuously changing relevance of any of the different influential factors. There are situations in which convictions play the prominent role in regulating practices; and there are other situations in which changes in material social structures exert stronger effects. Moreover, both causal factors are connected by the *experience* of social actors that is processed by the dispositions of the *habitus* and thus again has structuring effects on the social conditions. Praxeological sociology of religion is able to give a systematic account of various directions of causality since it triangulates different analytical models and provides the theoretical frame to do so; and praxeological sociology of religion strongly focuses on how actors process their experiences. In other words, praxeology leaves reductionism behind, whether it be materialist or neo-idealist (textist).

The present book is dedicated to the construction of a theoretical frame for a sociological approach to religious praxis without the focus of theoretical reasoning on religion itself. This is because we understand religious praxis to be just one of many forms of human praxis with its own specificities, but also with its relations to other kinds of praxis. We understand religion to be a human activity that people are caught in with their body, soul, and mind, and that people either share or argue over with their neighbors. What people believe is just one side of the coin,

9 There is an increasing number of scholars who approach religion from a praxeological, or at least a similar standpoint. One of the pioneers deserves to be mentioned first: Otto Maduro (2005). Beyond the authors mentioned in volume 1 (353ff.), we would like to list here some the authors in this line of research in alphabetical order. The scholars that contributed to Altglas and Wood 2018b; Egger et al. 2000; Fer 2010; Martikainen and Gauthier 2013; McCloud 2007; Rey 1999; 2007; Suárez 2015; Vásquez 2011 (esp. 231ff.).

the other side of which is the power and the capability to act that these people (and their institutions) have in relation to others and to the social opportunities and constraints they are situated in. Religion is mental and material praxis that operates through signs, practices, and things. In order to grasp religion as social praxis it is therefore reasonable to provide a theoretical and methodological frame that is valid for social praxis in general—which is certainly nothing specific only to praxeological sociology since most other theories, such as systems theory or rational choice, operate the same way. We will maintain a connection to religious praxis through many of the examples that illustrate theoretical considerations and through the vignettes that precede each chapter. However, more than that, the entire theoretical approach to praxis can be read as an approach to religious praxis. The elaborations on habitus of course work for the religious habitus as well, and so do the considerations regarding fields and the social space for the religious field and for the positions of religious actors in the social space.¹⁰

According to our understanding of religion,¹¹ the experiences of religious actors are central since they relate the processes of the material world and cognitive operations with one another. In short, religious interpretation counters experiences of contingency. Such experiences range from the reflection upon one's own finitude and mortality to concrete situations of social crises and threats, such as economic scarcity, military repression, and ecological catastrophes. The process of interpretation involves—to a large extent spontaneous and irreflexive—acts of perception and judgment as well as action orientation and action. Thus, religious interpretation is not simply a cognitive operation, but part of transforming social structures and essential for how actors are formed by their experiences of the social structure. The operational mode of this process is similar in religious and non-religious praxis. Yet, the specific difference resides in the religious actors' reference to transcendence. They interpret experience by means of a "promise

10 The suitability of Bourdieu's theoretical categories for an approach to is partly due to the fact that he developed and sharpened some of them—especially fields and habitus—in his early articles of 1971 on religion (Bourdieu 1987c, G: 2000c; 1991b, G: 2000b; see also Bourdieu 2000d; Rey 2007). Furthermore, his early studies on the Kabyle and the development of the concepts of habitus and symbolic violence addressed highly ritualized cultural praxis, in many ways similar to religion. However, his specific view on religion is flawed by the allegation that religious praxis simply is legitimatory of interests and especially of domination (Crossley 2001; Parker 1996; Urban 2003; also vol. 1, 353ff.). In consequence, Bourdieu's most relevant contribution to the study of religion is his general theory (Verter 2003, 150, 152; Rey 2007).

11 For our concept of religion, see Schäfer 2004a; 2009; 2014a; 2016b. The following considerations see with more detail in Schäfer et al. 2015a.

of salvation" (Riesebrodt 2010). Salvation can range from a ritual statement of authority, a fortuneteller's prognosis, or a miraculous healing to the expectance of a "new heaven and a new earth." The actors' reference to such an imagined transcendent causality can have different social effects, from legitimizing domination and integrating society through compensation to revolution.

The crucial point of difference to utopian aims of modern social movements in general is the reference to a transcendent entity, an "otherworldly" (Weber) reality. Religious actors derive their authority and orientation from the reference to a transcendent entity that they claim exists and to which they ascribe certain properties. Thus, religious actors connect the transcendent sphere to some idea of divine beings or "superhuman powers," as Riesebrodt (2010, 71ff.) puts it; in other words, to semantic content. They relate "earthly" experiences by causal nexūs to transcendent entities; and they hold up the distinction between experiences and their transcendent causes. The transcendent is believed to exist as an absolute being and, just as such, it becomes concrete and practical; it becomes an operator of practical sense and of practical logic. Thus, the relation between earthly experiences and otherworldly interpretations creates religious identities, strategies and, finally, praxis very much on its own. Hence, the specificity of religious praxis is not to strictly separate religious from non-religious spheres, or religious symbols from material processes. Its specificity resides in the interpretation of non-religious and material processes in a religious way, emphasizing the distinction between immanent and transcendent powers. In consequence, while the formal process of interpreting experience and creating identities and strategies in religion is entirely the same as in any other form of social praxis, in the face of one and the same social conditions and situations religious interpretation and experience display characteristically different capacities than non-religious interpretation. Thus, religious identities and strategies can provide an alternative and sometimes more effective way of coming to terms with challenges.

Since these religious processes of interaction as well as identity and strategy formation take place in the context of objectified and institutionalized social relations, these relations have to be accounted for from a theoretical and methodological perspective. The embodied operations and interactions must be understood within the framework of objectified social production and reproduction in the diverse spheres of society. In the sociological tradition, there are mainly two ways to address these social structures: functional and stratificatory differentiation. In praxeology, the former is theorized by the concept of field, further developing upon Weber's concepts of social spheres or life orders (Weber 1946a, *passim* and p. 323). In consequence, the relations among religious experts as well as the relation between experts and laity can be theoretically modeled as religious

field. The triangulation with the embodied conditions of the actors—habitus and practical sense—allows for the understanding of the influence of religious positions regarding religious convictions and vice versa. Stratificatory differentiation is theorized by the concept of the social space that allows one to locate actors in relation to other actors according to their overall capital accumulation. With regard to religious actors and their convictions, the model is useful to locate the actors within their objective social relations, that is, to focus on the relations between “status, class, and religion” and thus be able to reconstruct, for instance, “The religious propensities of peasantry, nobility and bourgeoisie.”¹² In other words, the triangulation between social space and religious habitus facilitates the understanding of the interplay between religious convictions and the overall opportunities and constraints the religious actors face.

In order to describe these practical relations well in their actor-specific and institutional dimensions, it is recommendable to apply the entire range of praxeological theorems, methods, and possibilities of triangulation that we are trying to provide with *HabitusAnalysis*. Since the formal processes are the same with regard to non-religious and religious praxis, the latter can be described by means of its relations to other forms of praxis and, at the same time, its specificities will become more visible. This approach requires epistemological reflections, which we have contributed in volume 1. Therefore, we will only share some brief thoughts on hermeneutics at this point.

With regard to the praxeological program, there is a *hermeneutical issue* to consider. It is about the reception of Bourdieu’s theory in the North Atlantic region. The problem becomes particularly visible from a Latin American perspective, or from the way in which Latin American sociologists work with Bourdieu’s theory.¹³ In Latin America, the theorems that focus on social structure (fields and social space) are more important for understanding symbolic practices than is the case in the North Atlantic. Many Latin American colleagues say that this has to do not least with their own precarious conditions that constantly remind them of the significance of objectified social conditions. Furthermore, there is another context of production and reception that sheds some light on the fate of Bourdieu’s theory in sociological debate. Bourdieu developed the cornerstones of his theory in the sixties and early seventies against the background of highly objectivistic

12 See Weber 1978, 468ff., as well as “The religion of non-privileged strata” (481ff.), and “Intellectualism, intellectuals, and salvation religion” (500ff.).

13 Castro and Suárez 2018; Maduro 2005 [first published 1979]; García and Gutiérrez 2000. See also Suárez 2006; 2009; Martínez 2007; Moraña 2014. And with *HabitusAnalysis* Delgado Molina 2018.

neo-Marxist and functionalist sociologies. In sharp distinction to the hegemonic currents of that time, he developed a theory that strongly focused on the embodied conditions of actors, habitus, practical logic, symbolic violence, culture, and so forth, as early as in *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, first published in French in 1972. Being published roughly around the same time as post-modernism started to gain momentum, there were two widespread types of reductionist reception. Some readers rejected Bourdieu's approach entirely (as determinist, making language and symbol a servant of the social structures, and similar accusations), while others overlook the socio-structural aspect and treat it as a theory of mere communication and symbolic relations. The "classifications" are deprived of the "classes," so to say, while for Bourdieu either one can only be understood in its reciprocal relation to the other (Bourdieu 2010, 468, G: 1982a, 727). In the latter way of reading his work, Bourdieu can be treated as a culturalist author, leaving aside his emphasis on the *relation* between embodied dispositions, symbolic and other practices, *and* objectified social conditions. If Bourdieu is currently the most cited and read sociologist worldwide, some of this success is probably due to a culturally reductionist reception of his work. This observation prompts a hermeneutical question. Over the course of the last thirty years or so, the hegemony of Marxist and functionalist objectivism has given way to subjectivist, post-modernist, communicational, and symbol-oriented interpretations of the sociological task, occupying a much stronger position in the field of sociology today than when *Outline* was first published. This change of context suggests a contemporary *relecture* of Bourdieu's *oeuvre*. It should be read in contrast to a completely different background than the one in distinction to which it was produced. In other words, while "classifications" had to be accentuated over "classes" in the 1960s and 70s, today it is the other way around: in contrast to an overly prolific interest in classifications, the classes and their reciprocal relations with the human mind and practices deserve attention again. For our interest in meaning, this hermeneutic condition implies the challenge of *not* getting stuck in the analysis of language use and symbolic practices alone, but rather paying special attention to the objectified conditions of language use, be these objectified as material structures, social institutions, and so forth, or embodied as dispositional structures. Throughout this book, the reader will note that embodied dispositions and objectified social conditions will be continuously related to each other by reference to experience and practices of actors.

In our opinion, the fact that Bourdieu's praxeology is so widely debated, established, and applied today is due to a paradox. On the one hand, Bourdieu emphasizes that his theory offers an open toolbox, and many scholars use his theory in this way. Concepts like habitus, cultural capital, field, and others are widely

used as single or combined tools in specific research designs. On the other hand, Bourdieu's type of praxeology has developed over the course of his work (and thanks to many scholars that follow in his footsteps) into a veritable grand theory that is capable of functioning as a framework of reference for many different kinds of theoretical and methodological approaches.

Bourdieu's talk of a toolbox has certain plausibility in view of his development of theory alongside empirical inquiries. It may even sound chic. Yet, it quickly loses its logic if a researcher intends to use just one single tool. I would even go so far as to say that the metaphor of the toolbox conveys (intended or unintended) misrecognition of the theory. It invites scholars to use one tool or another, and over the course of their work with it, the very dynamic of the overarching theory tends to increasingly draw the scholar into its logics. If you want to study, for example, the mechanisms of symbolic violence between two groups of people, it will not be enough to simply employ the concept of symbolic violence. The researcher's focus will additionally require clear concepts of misrecognition (building upon a certain idea of perception and judgment), which requires the modeling of the social differences between the groups at hand, a clear concept of what is meant by "symbolic" (which is quite different from the common sense concept), an idea about how social structure, experiences, and judgment are related, and about the meaning and function of capital, to name a few. Instead of just one tool, researchers need a set of matching tools. I think that this is due to the fact that Bourdieu's social theory indeed is not just a toolbox, but something like a grand theory. As such, it serves to frame different approaches to single areas of scholarly interest and to employ diverse analytical methods. It is possible that this capacity is one of the reasons for the wide reception of praxeology. A quick glance at the so-called "turns" might illustrate what I mean. Each "turn" indicates a specific research interest that can be connected to praxeological theory if desired. Many of the interests of the linguistic (Rorty), symbolic (Geertz), and corporeal turn (Gugutzer) can be addressed by the concepts of habitus and practical logic. The performative (Turner), iconic (Boehm), and spatial (Soja) turn, as well as intersectional perspectives can be responded to by the concepts of practical logic, logic of praxis, and the concepts of fields and social space. The large theoretical field of logic of praxis and practical logic even invites the use of discourse-analytical methods; and the concept of habitus together with the construction of the social space can be integrated into advanced methods of geometric data analysis.¹⁴ Finally, the in-

14 In this sense, as a team we have been invited to outline perspectives of mutual enrichment between *HabitusAnalysis* and geometric methods (Schäfer, Seibert, and Tovar 2019) as well as discourse analysis (Schäfer et al. 2015a; 2015b).

terests of feminist approaches have been addressed explicitly by Bourdieu himself (Bourdieu 2001a, G: 2005a). The relative openness of praxeology as an approach that oscillates between toolbox and grand theory allows for ample dialogue with all of these different approaches.

Nevertheless, as much as praxeology may be seen as a grand theory, it does not explain everything, nor does it aspire to do so. Certain aspects of private life may not be adequately accounted for, as Lahire (2011) points out. A torx screwdriver only fits torx screws. In consequence, one could interpret the toolbox metaphor as a euphemism that hides a grand theory. We understand it to be an understatement and a euphemism at the same time. It is an understatement since the entire conglomerate of Bourdieu's theorems exhibits an astonishing coherence over many different empirical fields and theoretical topics. It is a euphemism in the sense that it indeed hides the fact that praxeological theory neither claims to be nor is a theory with a universal capacity of sociological explanation. Since Bourdieu did not intend on constructing a perfectly conclusive and scholastic palace of theory, but rather advanced his work with empirical projects, his theory cannot be completely conclusive. Another reason that social theories often are not all too conclusive is social reality itself. Praxis proceeds quite logically, yet it is not completely logical. Bourdieu therefore calls "practical logic" an open, variable, and partly illogical logic. The concept of the field of power, for example, is one of the auxiliary constructs that are important for the overall approach, but that is difficult to integrate into a coherent theoretical logic. Furthermore, there are different concepts—such as field and market—that resemble and overlap more than one would consider useful for a scholastic theory. Furthermore, Bourdieu's vocabulary develops quite freely with every new empirical project and is not governed by a strict terminological regime, such as Luhmann's, for instance. Finally, praxeology is neither a theory of everything nor does it attempt to construct a social ontology.

On these grounds, any attempt to present Bourdieu's theory "as it really is" is doomed to fail. Neither do we aim at giving a systematic overview of it. There are so many compendia on Bourdieu's theory that there is hardly a need for another one. Our approach to Bourdieu's theory over three decades has always been motivated and informed by empirical research projects and their evaluations (see in the preface of this volume and of vol. 1); and finally, it focuses on the development of *HabitusAnalysis* as a theoretically established method of inquiry into the use of language and symbolic practices in the context of social conditions of existence. Therefore, ours is not only a perspective just as any other perspective in its own right; it has rather been developed as a praxeological method to address language and symbolic expression, which requires theoretical reflection and a serious theoretical framework. For this reason, this book will present some particularities,

such as the chapter on generative terms. We will give the usual overview at the end of this introduction.

As our main objective is to develop methods for the empirical research on *habitus*—networks of dispositions, as we conceptualize them—we have to deal with the fact that practical logic necessarily is not completely logical in a scientific sense. Therefore, we have to come to terms with its fuzziness and develop a form of praxis analysis that produces results that are sufficiently logical as to identify structures, as well as sufficiently open as to avoid artificial conclusiveness. In the present book, we will prepare the theoretical groundwork for our construction of models (in volume 3) that help to grasp the basic dynamics of practical logic and particularly practical sense.

Regarding epistemology, we emphasized Cassirer's relationist legacy and the pragmatist influences of Wittgenstein. Now, the main focus of Bourdieu (in our opinion) and of our reception of his theory are the relations between social structures (and respective data) and utterances and practices of actors. From this point of view, one could also establish a certain resemblance with logical positivism. However, one would certainly be aware of the fact that Bourdieu, in contrast to Carnap,¹⁵ is not interested in a constructional (sic!) system (Carnap 2003, 173ff., *Konstitutionssystem*) of concepts or objects, and that the point of comparison is rather the fact that Carnap analyzes reality by means of relations. We will not elaborate on this point, but will make some remarks to this regard throughout this book.

Our main field of empirical research is religion. Nevertheless, the praxeological approach we will outline in this book goes beyond religious praxis. Therefore, we have reduced the particular observations on religious praxis to a minimum.

Praxeology conveys normative conditions just as any other sociological approach does. Generally, normative presuppositions coin the perspectives on society to a certain extent. Weber's thesis of a necessary freedom from value judgments in social science is an important aim for reflexive research processes and research design. Methodological self-awareness—as advocated by Bourdieu (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991b, G: 1991a), and an important reason to implement models as instruments of control—serves this purpose. Nevertheless, each scholar has their own personal background, including the decisions they have made, starting in their early scientific career, which play a role in how they work. For instance, Weber's interest in social domination and power is a decision that, within its frame and due to its conscious employment, facilitates the control and prevention of corresponding value judgments in research. Nevertheless, it defines

15 Carnap 2003. A strong statement in this direction in Seibert 2018, 142ff.

criteria of observation, which another scholar—let us say Durkheim—might not employ. Similarly, some scholars look through the lens of the rational individual, some through that of the construction of the world by intersubjective communication, some through that of social systems void of actors, and so forth. This kind of decision may be supported by the research realized within the frame of each of these approaches and thus may entail self-confirming dynamics. Nevertheless, the initial decision to take a certain path and not another is generally made due to the influence of the social position of the scholar and of key experiences beyond and prior to the scientific system as such. In Bourdieu, this might have been his experience with the deep-rooted social inequality during his childhood and youth in Béarn and the conditions of war he witnessed in Algeria. However, these issues cannot be addressed in this book.¹⁶ We will simply state that in Bourdieu's theory—and in our reception of it—relations of power, domination, struggle, and social inequality are central and are a precondition of his sociological work.

Bourdieu's focus on struggle, power, and social inequality is most likely the reason some critics call Bourdieu a Marxist. Some others in turn even doubt he has a handle on the concept of capitalism (Calhoun 1993, 68f.). Although this may be the case, praxeological theory has the normative bias of seeing the world as a place of inequality and power struggles. This inclination is also easy to tell from Bourdieu's political activities for social justice and against neoliberalism.¹⁷ Inasmuch as his sociology serves to uncover well-hidden power relations and the oppression of human beings by other human beings, it is a sociology which, in the best tradition of European humanism, is not just an awareness campaign, but an "enlightenment campaign" (*Aufklärungskampagne*, Egger and Schultheis 2014, 254).

Of course, there is a bias and some pitfalls that need to be controlled. But every sociology has its biases and pitfalls—and approaches whose representatives claim not to have any normative precondition are even worse. For instance, which kind of hermeneutics do those who denounce Bourdieu for having a "hermeneutics of suspicion" have themselves? A hermeneutics of naïveté? To simply register symbolic expression without putting it in its social context of use is not sociology and, moreover, an irresponsible attitude in times when troll armies manipulate information worldwide and governments as well as right wing activists jeopardize democratic politics by calculated fake news. Praxeology, in any case, focuses the social conditions and effects of symbolic expression; and it reveals its bias towards

16 See Bourdieu 2004c, G: 2002; Schultheis 2007.

17 For example only a few sources: Bourdieu 1998l, G: 2004d; 1998m, G: 2004e; 1998n, G: 1998o; 1996c.

an understanding of society as a network of conflictive relations and even renders this bias methodologically reflexive—enlightened, so to say.

In the *present book* we face the difficulty that the leading concepts of praxeology explain one another. To do this condition justice, a written presentation cannot proceed in a linear mode, but must constantly make recursive references. The concepts are developed according to practical research and its requirements so that they hardly can be put into hierarchies (such as neo-Platonism would have it). One possible way to structure a book on praxeological theory would be to arrange important concepts in a “series” (Cassirer), going from objectified to embodied conditions. The result would be the following: Dispositions—habitus—practical sense—practical logic—logic of praxis—fields—social space.¹⁸ We have designed the second part of the book according to this series in order to map praxeology. However, mapping is a problem if it establishes defined categories and thus draws borders along an open area that in fact has crisscrossing relations. In the second part, we will only be able to partially remedy the problem of categorization with the following measures: frequent cross references, resumption of concepts in different contexts, and with a very special last chapter. In its first section we “look back” on the entire book from the perspective of objectified structures (fields and social space) and establish cross references from there. Readers who are more interested in fields and social space can thus discover from the perspective of these objectified structures views on the theories of the embodied conditions of praxis and on the practical logic. This editorial measure might not be the philosopher’s stone, but it at least does some justice to the recursiveness of the theoretical concepts.

For the *first part* of the book, we have chosen an unusual approach to praxeological theory in order to reveal some of its internal dynamics that in many other explanations are hidden by the emblematic concepts, like habitus or field. We focus on generative terms of praxeology. That is, on concepts that traverse praxeology as a whole and function as a kind of nervous system of the theory.

Thus, in the first part of the book, we will identify a couple of concepts—such as operator, perception, judgment, scheme, network and more—that are not considered emblematic concepts of praxeology, but that operate, so to say, under the

18 Other concepts, such as embodied and objectified capital, illusio, game, sense of one’s place, strategy, speech, classification, classes, and so forth, can easily be arranged within this series of main theoretical reference points. Since the use of the concepts of practical sense, practical logic, and logic of praxis in Bourdieu is somewhat blurred, their position in the series is the result of our interpretation of Bourdieu’s sociology (Schäfer 2015a).

surface of Bourdieu's theoretical insignia (such as habitus, field, and social space) and that function as generative terms for praxeological theory. These concepts help to understand the practical operations implied by the emblematic concepts in more detail. In consequence, the generative terms are highly relevant for our goal of establishing (in vol. 3) a method for the empirical analysis of habitus in the context of fields and social space. With this goal in mind, we aim at establishing vocabulary that is as clear-cut as possible for empirical praxeological research.¹⁹ In consequence, we have to deal with two facts: First, Bourdieu even uses his central concepts in a somewhat opalescent way and constantly modifies them over time. Second, the habitus theory is pivotal for Bourdieu's entire praxeology as well as for our methodology. Hence, we have to manage the task of methodologically distilling viable concepts that, at the same time, narrow down the meaning of some key concepts and still stay true to the logic of praxeology. In other words, we have to name and describe those concepts that best serve to develop the projected methodology of empirical praxeological research (vol. 3).

Generative terms represent deep operators—"underneath" the central theoretical concepts. Often, they denote single processes (perception, judgment) that the major concepts refer to across-the-board. Or they indicate functional properties (fuzziness, network structure) that go unmentioned with the main concepts. Habitus, for instance, is often used as a very wide and global concept, but in order to understand this concept adequately it is necessary to grasp the operating terms, such as embodiment, schemes, the dynamics of perception, judgment, and action orientation, dispositions, and so forth. The generative terms represent most of the internal rationality presupposed by Bourdieu's major concepts and we consider them to be key in the development of a viable methodology for *HabitusAnalysis*. They serve to specify single practical operations that are useful for deriving operational categories for the construction of models and other methodological procedures. A side effect, highly welcome from an epistemological perspective, is that generative terms help to prevent the reification of the main concepts.

Our examination of the generative terms in the first part of the book focuses on *social actors*. For one thing, as to our understanding the social actor is at the

19 But we do not intend to develop a conceptual metaphysics of social life, as we already highlighted in *HabitusAnalysis 1*. The relations we establish here between generative terms and major theoretical concepts of Bourdieu's theory are merely analytical and are exclusively for the purpose of clarifying our vocabulary for the construction of the method. Nevertheless, we are well aware that a rigorous analytical distinction might also entail the repression of a productive conceptual indeterminacy, which leaves a couple of theoretical distinctions intentionally unmarked.

center of Bourdieu's praxeology; for another, we are mainly interested in the concept of habitus. Hence, we have chosen those generative terms that prove to be most relevant for the processes of the actors' "internalization of externality and the externalization of internality" (Bourdieu). With respect to fields and social space, the central generative term capital is also addressed in the first part. A closer look to the first part reveals that the considerations contribute to a theory of the social actor without focusing the argument on the *concept* of actor. Developing Bourdieu's concept of habitus further, we understand identity, and thereby the social actor, to be a network of dispositions (Schäfer 2015a; 2005). We will address this topic more closely in the second part. However, the operators and operations that are considered in the first part—mainly internalization, transformation, and externalization—theorize the processual logic by means of which social agency is constituted.

The first part, "*Generative terms*," is structured as follows. The first chapter is dedicated to three concepts that are used in the entire theory: struggle, actors, and operations (and conceptual derivatives)—addressing, beyond Bourdieu, the topic of cooperation as well. The following three chapters on internalization, transformation, and externalization serve as a preparatory exercise for the development of the dispositional concept of habitus in the second part of the book. We go into detail about the processes of cognitive transformation of experience into judgments and action orientation. Hence, this part is crucial for the theoretical foundation of our model of the praxeological square, which we will develop in vol. 3.²⁰ The chapter "Externalization" focuses on pragmatic aspects of the habitus, paying special attention to the concept of symbol (and its derivatives), discourse, and misrecognition.

The first part will conclude with a comprehensive chapter about one of the most important generative praxeological terms: capital. We will examine the legacies of Marx and Weber, differentiate between specific sorts of capital, and address the specificities of symbolic capital as well as the dynamics of conversion between different fields of praxis.

The second part of the book, "*Mapping praxeology*," attempts to map praxeological theory according to our interest in language and other symbolic expressions *in the context* of objectified socio-structural conditions. From a methodological perspective, this goal implies an analytical triangulation of qualitative and quantitative procedures. From a theoretical perspective, this implies a wide variety of praxeological concepts. We have to clarify concepts in a range of variation be-

20 See in Schäfer 2015a, 229ff.; Schäfer et al. 2015a; 2015b.

tween those that are directed towards embodied conditions, those that address practical interaction, and those that address objectified social conditions. We will have to address the theoretical series of “dispositions—habitus—practical sense—practical logic—logic of praxis—fields—social space.” Our general interest in the relation between socio-structural inequality and embodied dispositions presents us with the task of interpreting the central and most widely used concepts of praxeology, spanning the continuum from social space to habitus.

How are *the first and the second part* of the book related to one another? When we map praxeology according to its most emblematic concepts, we outline the theoretical environment for the operations of the generative terms. For instance, with regard to understanding habitus, in the first part, we opt to describe in detail single operations this concept refers to and learn about the operations associated with it: embodiment, schemes, the dynamics of perception, judgment, and action orientation, dispositions, and so forth. In consequence, we do not understand the concept of habitus as a substance, but as a theoretical model that combines several practical operations. In the second part, we focus on the concept of habitus from a different perspective. We now explain habitus (and other strong Bourdieusian concepts) as a term within a wider network or “series” (Cassirer) of theoretical concepts, which is defined both by its relations to other terms and by its internal processes (as discussed in detail in the first part). Additionally, we discuss the general theoretical background of the theoretical concepts in sociology and philosophy.

We understand—according to Cassirer and Bourdieu—praxeological concepts to be *models* that allow the observation of social praxis from a certain perspective and with an explicit interest (vol. 1, 87ff.). As instruments of scientific cognition, the concepts are conceived as forming a series of mutually explicative terms that result from previous research. The very fact that some readers would like to change the order of such a series or add a concept here and there shows that the terms are mutually interpretative. In this sense, the theoretical concepts in their specific order, as addressed in this part of the book, propose an environment of operation to contextualize the generative terms of praxeology. This environment can of course be conceived in a more or less different way, depending on the researcher’s goals.

The detailed approach to the common praxeological concepts through the inquiry into generative terms also prevents the misunderstanding of well-known concepts as substances whose relations could be reduced to a single function between two entities (as exemplified with the phrase “the field determines the habitus”). We can rather draw the attention to the usefulness and potential of the major praxeological concepts for modeling creativity and variability. With

regard to the concept of habitus, its disaggregation does not only facilitate the theorization of the creative potential of habitus. It also allows for the development of a methodological model for the empirical analysis of habitus, the praxeological square and network (vol. 3). Beyond that, this dispositional understanding of habitus allows for the reconceptualization of social actors as both collective and individual networks of dispositions and, from there, for the development of a new theory of identity and strategy.²¹

In the *second part* of the book we will interpret Bourdieu's theory in a conventional way—at first glance. At second glance, we will show that the inquiry into the generative concepts allows for some new accentuations and further developments in our mapping of praxeology according to the units of “habitus, practical logic, and struggles.” We will proceed as follows.

The first chapter is dedicated to “Creativity in relations: habitus and the practical sense.” Instead of emphasizing the reproductive features of the concept of habitus, we foster a certain tendency in Bourdieu's work towards a dispositional theory of habitus in order to theorize the creative potential of a contextually situated praxis of human actors. Based upon this interpretation of the habitus, a more creative and variable understanding of the practical sense is possible.

The *dispositional concept of habitus* allows for a corresponding theory of actors as networks of dispositions. We will address topics like complexity, intuition, improvisation, newness, reflexivity, and the relation between the individual and the collective. These considerations generate an understanding of practical sense as the embodied (habitus) and objectively visible (practical logic) capability of actors to take part in social praxis and thus in social struggles. Besides a sound foundation of the concept of practical sense in phenomenology, this approach brings the role of interests and forms of social involvement into the spotlight, and with it concepts like *illusio*, *doxa*, investments, or stakes.

The following chapter, “*Operating in between*: practical logic and logic of praxis,” presupposes a major theoretical decision. The concepts of habitus and fields/social space address embodied and objectified *conditions* of social praxis, but not the operations and processes of praxis. Bourdieu simply analyzes the operations and processes in correspondence with his current empirical investigation. He recurs to different methods, for instance, of linguistic and ethnological origin, and uses them to draw conclusions about the embodied and objectified conditions of praxis—habitus, fields, and social space. With our terminological decision to employ the two concepts of practical logic and logic of praxis, we intend to create a

21 For a brief outline of this theory of identity see below (2.1.1.3 and 2.2.4.2); see also Schäfer 2005; 2015a; 2016a.

“theoretical space” for the analysis of the dynamics of praxis. From a methodological perspective, the “space” between the embodied and the objectified conditions of praxis is open to the use of a large variety of sociological methods both for the analysis of qualitative and quantitative data (see vol. 3).

From our point of view and research interest, we consider the following topics to be particularly relevant. First, we will develop specific concepts of strategy and identity as mutually informative processes. Besides tackling the problem of utility maximization, the reformulation of identity as a network of dispositions allows for a fresh approach to various topics, such as strategic identities and identitarian strategies. The chapter ends with a long section on “Symbolic power, violence, and struggle”—an important issue not only in Bourdieu’s sociology. The concept of symbolic violence particularly addresses the consent of the oppressed to be oppressed and is thus intimately related to misrecognition. While Bourdieu is interested almost exclusively in the hidden and hard to identify forms of symbolic violence, we will expand this discussion by describing visible forms of violence as a context for symbolic violence with reference to Johan Galtung. Within the context of power-broking, we will describe the mechanisms of the tacit imposition of misrecognition; and beyond Bourdieu, we will also address practices of symbolic resistance.

The last chapter of the second part addresses fields and social space as models of “*specific struggles*.” The models of fields and social space are approached from the vantage point of the basic generative term “struggle.” In consequence, the models are not understood as units that depict social entities (in an ontological sense) that exist side by side: the political field beside the economic and the cultural, and the social space, and so forth. Rather, they are understood as observational instruments that structure the struggles in society according to defined research interests. The main interest is similar to Marx or Weber: detecting relations of domination that underlie the social struggles and thus disclose the dynamics that drive these struggles. Thereby, the specific structures of modern societies are addressed by the distinction between functional (fields) and stratificatory differentiation (social space).

The major generative term that helps to understand the dynamics of social struggle is capital. This social operator contributes particularly good instruments for dealing with the relations of power that permeate the entire society. In consequence, there are common features shared by both the models for functional and for stratificatory differentiation. Following this insight, we divide this chapter into three principal sections: common features between the models of field and space, specific dynamics of fields, and particularities of the space model. In addition, we will address somewhat critically Bourdieu’s proposal of a “field of power.”

The section on “common features” of fields and social space starts by spanning the theoretical challenges and perspectives of functional and stratificatory models in sociology with reference to different scholars. Among other issues, we will discuss the benefits and limits of geometrical modeling and bivariate approaches to social relations as well as the relation between social structures and habitus. The next section addresses fields as the praxeological way of modeling functional differentiation in an actor-oriented way and with a particular focus on its relevance for our methodological work in vol. 3. After the discussion of theoretical issues, we will tackle for the main issues of model construction. In this subsection we will prepare for vol. 3, examining possibilities of constructing models based on Bourdieu’s sketch of the field of literature (*Rules of Art*) and those based on multiple correspondence analysis (mainly *State Nobility*). Another section addresses the social space as a model of stratificatory differentiation. After dealing with the relevance of concepts such as social class, capital, culture, habitus, and occupation for the construction of the social space, we will again address different ways to model: correspondence analysis and a bivariate model. In this chapter we will develop the theory and the models of fields and social space as complements to the theory of habitus—which is also true the other way around. *HabitusAnalysis* is based on this relation between habitus, fields, and social space—a relation which, from a methodological perspective, requires triangulation.

From a sociological point of view, that brings issues like struggle and inequality into the focus of attention, *power* is necessarily a central topic as well. Therefore, Bourdieu proceeds from the theories of fields and social space and moves to the construction of a field of power. While this model offers some new impulses for establishing a sociology of elites, it nevertheless has some flaws. While we sympathize with Bourdieu’s attempt to tackle the problem of a relational theory of social power positions, we will not, however, finish this section by suggesting the use of a specific model.

The book ends with a twofold *outlook*: reading the book backwards and forwards. The “forward outlook” is of course focused on vol. 3. The “backward outlook” is slightly unusual, as we have already stated. It is neither a summary nor a conclusion. It is written with particular concern for those readers who are more interested in fields and social space than in habitus and begin by reading the last chapter of the book. They will become aware that the praxeological concepts are recursive and will lack the deliberations of earlier and at times rather long chapters. As a special service to these readers, I have selected some topics that emerge from theories of fields and social space and refer back to issues discussed in earlier chapters more than to other topics. We will address the following topics: dispositions; the transfer of practical logics between fields; social contexts that are not

seen as fields; language as a medium and the analysis of discourse; and finally, misrecognition in the tension between objective positions and symbolic violence.

The “forward outlook” provides a brief insight into the projected third volume of *HabitusAnalysis*.

Finally, there are some technical details left to explain. The book begins with a reference to the situation in an indigenous Guatemalan town. Just as in volume 1, we intend to facilitate the approach to the theoretical reflection with vignettes that tell everyday stories of people that correspond to the theoretical issues dealt with in the respective chapter. These scenes are only partly fictitious. The vignettes in the first volume illustrate the situation of the Guatemalan civil war, which was raging during our first comprehensive period of field research. The vignettes in the present volume reflect the Guatemalan post-war era of the 1990s, when I spent short periods in the field. The vignettes in the third volume will refer to a large research project realized between 2012 and 2014.

The book also presents text excerpts from Bourdieu’s works at the start of every chapter. The texts are meant to serve as a quick orientation in the vastness of Bourdieu’s publications and as a basis for a critical reading of our theoretical considerations.

We will of course annex a bibliography. But in the age of full-text searchable PDFs, we will forego an index.